University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
The Montana Constitution Collection
1970

Trends in Judicial Reform
Unknown

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/montanaconstitution

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Unknown, "Trends in Judicial Reform" (1970). The Montana Constitution Collection. 264.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/montanaconstitution/264

This Committee Minutes and Testimony is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Montana Constitution Collection by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

APPENDIX
TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REFORM

A.

CREATION OF A SINGLE LEVEL TRIAL COURT AND ABOLITION OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE

The constitutions of thirty states now contain no provision vesting judicial power in
justices of the peace.1 The direction of change is clear, and if the last few years are
indicative, the rate of change is accelerating. Since 1965, constitutional protection of
justices of the peace has been removed in eleven states.2

Some states have retained justices of the peace, but are attempting to upgrade them with
reform of fees, rules, administration, and required training.
Four states have made
constitutional amendments that specifically provide that the legislature may abolish justices
of the peace.Two states are now considering proposals that would abolish justices of the
peace.5

A variety of means are used to provide substitutions for justice courts, but the predominant
method involves a magistrate or commissioner system as an integral part of the general trial
level court.6 Some states create or continue small claims divisions, municipal and county
courts,'and some simply place former justice court jurisdiction in the general trial court.B

Finally the overall effect of nearly even constitutional change Is to reduce the number of
courts of limited jurisdiction, and to move toward a single level of trial court in the
state.
The Consensus of the Citizens’ Conference on the Montana Judicial System, held in Great Falls
September 29-30, October 1, 1966 was:

The Montana courts of limited and special jurisdiction in existence, that is,
the Justice of the Peace and Police Courts, on the other hand, with some excep
tions, are generally not satisfactory in that they are not uniformly providing
the quality of justice desired by Montana citizens. This inability to provide
a satisfactory quality of justice is directly related to the following conditions:
1. the failure of our laws to require adequate qualifications for the judges of
these courts, 2. the use of the fee system in the compensation of many of the
judges, 3. inadequate salaries, 4. the political and commercial pressures to
which these judges are sometimes subjected by virtue of the method of their
selection, 5. the failure to restrict their extra-judicial activities, and
6.
the Jack of adequate courtroom facilities. It is recognized that owing to
rhe sparse population and remote location of many Montana communities, these
problems are difficult of solution.

and further:

-

The type and quality of justice presently being provided in these courts
could be materially improved by adoption of a unified court system which
would provide a district court level of judicial quality for all legal pro
ceedings. This unified court system might be materially implemented by in
corporating within it a provision whereby, where needed, district court
judges might select persons to act as deputy judges or magistrates to assist
the district court in supplying continuous court representation in remote
areas of the state.
The United States District Courts utilize a magistrate system,10 adopted in 1968 to replace
a nearly identical system of District Court Commissioners. While that system is analagous
to what might be implemented in Montana, there are some differences: the Montana plan
would permit magistrates to try cases, while federal magistrates, except for minor criminal
offenses, cannot;11 there is no term certain for appointment in the Montana plan, while
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there is for federal
that of the district
however, appointment
provision for either
admitted to practice

B.

magistrates;12 jurisdiction of magistrates under the Montana plan is
court, while jurisdiction of federal magistrates is limited.13 In both,
is by the district judge, or judges, according to local needs, with
full or part time positions.14 Both require that a magistrate be
before the appropriate bar, except in certain specific circumstances. ’

MERIT SELECTION OF JUDGES

The merit selection of judges involves four basic elements: a nominating commission of
diverse membership; appointment of judges from nominees submitted by the commission;
approval or rejection of the judge at election; and a method of removal of judges. These
elements are present in some form in every state that has adopted all, or some portion of
the merit system, for all, or some of their courts.
Fourteen states now use some part of the system for some of their courts.
to utilize the plan was Missouri in 1945.1

The first state

At least one nominating commission is currently a constitutionally created body in nine
states,2 and is proposed in Indiana.3 Idaho, Utah, and Vermont have statutory commissions.
Membership of the commissions vary considerably in size,5 composition and method of
select ion.6 Some states utilize separate commissions for each court7 while others have but
one statewide commission.Most, however, include representation from the judiciary, the
bar, and the general public.

Appointment by the governor of the state from nominees submitted to him for each j jdicial
vacancy is the second essential feature of merit selection. A check exists in some states,
providing that the chief justice of the supreme court is to make the appointment if the
governor has not done so in a specified time.9 Commissions are usually required to submit
three nominees for each -vacancy on appellate courts, and two for trial level courts.

The third element requires the judge to submit to approval or rejection by the voters upon
expiration of his term of office and declaration of his candidacy. Terms of office vary
somewhat, as do the details of election, bvt most variations are not substantive.^ Election
is usually uncontested at general election under the merit system, except in Vermont wher the general assembly electa Supreme Court justices from nominees submitted by a nominating
commission,^ and in Utah which allows a contested election.12 The usual format of the
ballot looks much like this:
"Shall Justice (Judge)
(or other) Court be retained in office?

Yes

____ ____ of the Supreme
No
"

The final element is a means of disciplining and removing judges. While the traditional
method has been impeachment, a growing number of states have created a Judicial Qualifica
tions Council, under various names, whose function is to investigate complaints or charges,
and to bring action. This concept has been adopted in several states that utilize no other
part of merit salection.13

Membership, terms, and method of ‘.election varies considerably,1^ l>ut the function and
powers of each are relatively uni form.
The commissions are constitutionally created in fifteen states,15 statutory’ in Connecticut
and 0regonl6 and are being proposed as constitutional entities in three other states.I7
The 1966 Montana Citizens' Conference on the Judiciary came to this consensus:
The non-partisan election system of selecting the judges has not
succeeded in removing the Montana judiciary from political pressures
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and uncertainties. To succeed in bringing the lawyers best qualified for
judicial office to the bench of this state, selection of judges should he
made by a system based entirely upon merit.
The selection system should include nomination of candidates bv a com
mission composed of lay citizens as well as members of the bar. Appoint
ment of the judges should be made by the Governor, reserving to the people
the right to vote at reasonable intervals upon the issue of whether a
particular judge should or should not be continued in office.

And further:

Impeachment as a means of removing judges from office has proven
unworkable. A system must be adopted in Montana to provide a means whereby
judges may be censured without removal, investigated without publicity, yet
removed if necessary w.Lhout the cumbersome, costly, and time consuming
process of impeachment by the legislature. To this end it is our recommend
ation that study be given to the various plans now in effect in other states
to determine which will be most adequate for Montana. Any plan to be adopted
should contain provisions for the appointment of an investigative committee
composed of judges appointed by the Supreme Court, lawyers appointed by the
Montana Bar Association and laymen appointed by the Governor. The work of
this committee will be to receive and confidentially investigate complaints,
reporting, if necessary, to the Montana Supreme Court which will act as
final arbiter. The standards for removal should be sufficiently broad so
as to leave discretion in the hands of the committee and the Supreme Court.

C.

VESTING ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL IN THE STATE’S HIGHEST COURT

In probably no other area of judicial reform has there been so uniform a shift as that
expressly vesting administrative power in the state's highest court, and providing for admin
istrators of court systems.

Seventeen states have made the power constitutional.1 Twenty more states have granted the
power by statute.- Only thirteen states remain w thout the express grant of power of admin
istrative control to their state’s highest court, and two of those have proposals to do so.
And in another three states, administrative power is vested in a judicial control group.
Many states do provide for an advisory body for administration, but their powers are confined
to reports and recommendations.$ & growing number - a total now of thirty-eight states provide for administrative directors, or assistants to carry out the administrative function.6
A separate provision expressly granting power to the chief justice to assign judges is not
unusual and presently exists in twenty-eight states.7

As for the power to redistrict the state, the Oklahoma constitution specifically provides
that the Legislature "may at any time delegate authority to the Supreme Court to designate
by court rule the division of the state into districts and the number of judges."8 Most
state legislatures have the power to re-district the stated
In Montana, the Supreme Court presently .ias, and has exercised, administrative control in
certain specific situations.10 The proposed constitutional language is not a great
expansion of power, but as pointed out in the comment, is designed to create a clear line of
administrative control.

The 1966 Montana Citizens' Conference Consensus statement made their position clear:
In theory a unified court system is more desirable than the present autonomous
system of courts in Montana todav. Any unified system of courts to be capable
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of working practically in Montana must take into account our sparsely
populated and remote areas, yet avoid sacrificing ready accessibilitv of
a forum to litigants.
Judicial business ought to be conducted in an efficient manner
utilizing up to date techniques of administration, including nnalvsls
and assignment of judges to equalize case loads. The performance ot
minor non-judicial administrative details should not be left to the
judges.
The chief administrative officer in a unified court system should be
a judicial person, probably the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
he should have an administrative assistant. The powers and duties of the
chief administrative officer should include the assignment of judges from
one district to another, delegation of administrative authority, formula
tion of uniform procedures, and requirement of uniform and periodic report
ing of all judges concerning the volume and status of cases in their respect
ive courts. He should have assistance in such matters as preparation and
presentation of budgets and compilation of statistical data.
D.

VESTING RULE MAKING POWER IN THE STATE’S HIGHEST COURT

Recognized to be inherent in many state's highest courts, either by statute, case law, or
both, the power to make rules for the regulation of practice and procedure is granted by the
constitution of fifteen states,and by statute in twenty-two moreJ An additional three
states have proposals tc- make the power constitutional.^ In California the gower to make
rules for the courts of the state is expressly granted to a
i_ judicial council-5 and in four
states it is expressly reserved to the legislature by the constitution.®’ The Oregon
legislature has expressly denied rule-making power to its Supreme Court.
Advisory groups for rules of court are operative in twelve states® in addition to, or instead
of, the general advisory council discussed in E, infra, which usually include a direction to
conduct studies of practice and procedure.

In 1948 the United States Congress established a Judicial Conference of the United States.9
By amendment in 1958, the Conference was provided with this '.nstruction:

The Conference shall also carry on a continuous study of the operation and
effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use
as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other courts of the United States
pursuant to law. Such changes in and additions to those rules as the Confer
ence may deem desirable to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in admin
istration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of un
justifiable expense and delay shall be recommended by the Conference from time
to time to the Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption, modification
or rejection, in accordance with law.
Under the authority of that
Federal Rules of Procedure,
That committee prepared and
Courts and Magistrates^ to
Supreme Court.

paragraph, the United States Supreme Court has adopted the
and has appointed an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence.
submitted Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
the Committee on Rules and Practice for their submission to the

Upon review, a second draft Las been prepared for re-submission to the Supreme Court. 12

Once federal rules of evidence are adopted state courts will find it much to their advantage,
as they did with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to adopt state rules of evidence
similar to the federal rules. Utah has already granted to their Supreme Court the authority
to make and promulgate ruxes of evidence.
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Montana, by statute in 1963, granted to the Supreme Court rule making power for civil
procedure, and in 1967 did the same for ciminal procedure. The grant of power to make
rules for criminal procedure, however, expired on January 1, 1969, ’ and has not been
extended. The power to make rules for civil procedure was not made subject to termination.
The key provisions are below:
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947)

Rule 83. Each district court, upon agreement of the judges or a majority
thereof, may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice
not inconsistent with these rules or other rules prescribed by the supreme
court. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall
upon their promulgation be furnished to the supreme court of this state. In
all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.

Civi1 Procedure:

Ji 11e 93 Civil Procedure

93-2801-1. The supreme court of this state shall have the power to regulate the
pleading, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in civil actions in all
courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it from time to time, for the
purpose of simplifying judicial proceedings, in the courts of Montana and for
promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. Such rules
shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant
and shall not be inconsistent with the constitution of the state of Montana.
93-2801-2. Before any rules are adopted the supreme court shall appoint an
advisory committee consisting of eight members of the bar of the state and at
least three judges of the district court tc assist the court in considering and
preparing such rules as it may adopt.

93-2801-3. Before any rule is adopted, the supreme court shall distribute copies
of the proposed rule to the bench and bar of the state for their consideration and
suggestions and give due c msideration to such suggestions as they may submit to
the court. The Montana Bar Association or the Association of Montana Judges may
file with the supreme court a petition specifying their suggestions concerning
any existing or proposed rule and requesting a hearing thereon within six (6)
months after the filing of the petition.
93-2801-4. Any district court and the supreme court, may adopt rules of court
governing its practice so long as such rules are not in conflict with the
rules promulgated by the supreme court of the state of Montana, in accordance
with this act.

E.

JUDICIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Two forms of advisory groups are present in modern judicial systems. The first is an
internal group, compos'd of all the judges of a court, or a state, usually referred to as
a judicial conference
Hie second is a more recert development for most states and is
essentially an advisory group designed to provide diverse representation, usually created
as a judicial council.

Three .tates now have a constitutionally created judicial council.-*- While the power
to call a judicial conference of judges is recognized as within the rule-making pow- r of
most state’s highest courts,2 two states make constitutional provision for its meeting.^
Councils are created by statute in twenty-five states^ and conferences in nineteen.'1 While
structure, membership, method of selection, term of office, and other detail varies with
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each state, most include representation of three groups - the judiciary, the bar and the
public, and most require periodic reporting to the legislature or Supreme Court or both.

Both conferences and councils are granted only the power to recommend in most cases, and
their functions and duties are often similar. California and New York, however, vest
substantive power in their judicial councils/ Other states create advisory groups for
temporary or limited purposes.?

The consensus of the 1966 Citizens’ Conference on the Montana Judicial System concisely des
cribes both the function and representation of most advisory councils, as well as recognizing
the need:
A permanent citizen’s steering committee should immediately be established
to coordinate further study of action. This committee should be large enough
to be representative of all areas and walks of life in Montana, yet small
enough to be effective.
F. APPOINTMENT OF CLERKS OF COURT

The power of courts to appoint their own clerks has clearly become the predominant method
of selection. Twenty-seven now constitutionally provide for appointive clerks in the state's
highest court,1 and sixteen more do so by statute/
Rhode Island provides that the governor with the advice and consent of the senate, shall
appoint the clerk of its Supreme Court.3

Only five states, including Montana, presently elect the clerk of the state's highest court/
At the general trial level, however, most states still elect their clerks of court/’ with
ten states providing for appointment.6
But appointed clerks again predominate in courts of limited jurisdiction,? and in those slates
who have them, in courts of intermediate appellate jurisdiction.

G.

STATE FINANCED JUDICIARY

There is considerable variation in the methods used to finance state judicial systems. There
are, however, some uniform characteristics: All states finance their court of last resort,
and all But one their intermediate appellate courts.
Many, especially those without an
intermediate appellate court, finance the trial level courts/

Where there are multiple trial courts, or multiple courts of special or limited jurisdiction,
a variety of financing arrangements occur. Some states share the costs of salaries and other
expenses by paying a minimum salary and allowing or requiring salary supplements by the county
or city.- Others begin with an even state/county division of cost.14 Some apportion costs
according to the population of counties served/ In addition, most counties are required to
provide the facilities necessary for court-space, utilities, furnishings, supplies.6

Financing of local courts o' limited jurisdiction is usually borne by the county or city served.
The use of fees in lieu of r as a supplement to salary persists in a large number of states,
but is confined to courts of limited jurisdiction, and is of decreasing frequency.?
More recent developments tend to simplify and centralize the financing by simply providing
for a state funded judicial system/ either a result of or a concurrent change with simpli
fication of the state's judicial system itself. Preparation of budgets under modern systems
is recognized as an administrative function, and provided for as such.9
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The Montana Constitution now provides that the salaries of the justices of the Supreme
Court, and of the judges of the District Court are paid by the state.10 Justices of the
peace are paid by salary or fees;11space, furnishings and other expenses are provided by the
state for the Supreme Court,!2 and by the counties for the district courts.Salaries of
clerks of District Courts are paid by the county.1^

Fees and fines collected go to cities, counties, and the state, depending upon a variety of
factors.
Montana citizens recognized the need for reform of the financial system in 1966 in the
consensus statement of the Citizens’ Conference on the Judiciary: "The cost of operating the
court system should be funded through the state legislature and budgeting should be taken
from the hands of the county commissioners."
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